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Abstract. Opaque predicates are a well-established fundamental building block for
software obfuscation. Simplified, an opaque predicate implements an expression that
provides constant Boolean output, but appears to have dynamic behavior for static
analysis. Even though there has been extensive research regarding opaque predicates
in software, techniques for opaque predicates in hardware are barely explored. In
this work, we propose a novel technique to instantiate opaque predicates in hardware,
such that they (1) are resource-efficient, and (2) are challenging to reverse engineer
even with dynamic analysis capabilities. We demonstrate the applicability of opaque
predicates in hardware for both, protection of intellectual property and obfuscation
of cryptographic hardware Trojans. Our results show that we are able to implement
stealthy opaque predicates in hardware with minimal overhead in area and no impact
on latency.
Keywords: Opaque Predicates · Obfuscation · Hardware Reverse Engineering ·
Hardware Analysis
1 Introduction
The process of designing, implementing and testing hardware cores is both time consuming
and costly. Thus, in today’s hardware design process, not every piece of a product is
created anew. Many products consist partially of Intellectual Property (IP)-cores, i.e.
third party modules. The market for IP-cores is large with USD 2.45 billion in 2013 [1]
and was recently “expected to be worth USD 6.22 billion by 2023” [2]. IP-cores are sold
as either soft-cores in the form of HDL code, firm-cores as a netlist, or hard-cores as a
fixed layout for a certain technology. Preferably they are sold as hard- or firm-cores with
only the interfaces and functional specifications known to maintain exclusivity and hinder
IP-theft. Consequently, the IP-core market suffers from copyright infringements as code
can illegally be copied without relicensing. Additionally, IP-cores have become a major
target for reverse engineering in order to understand technologies of competitors and to
find hidden backdoors.
Protecting hardware designs has therefore moved into the focus of the design industry.
To counter IP-theft, vendors include watermarks into their products. A watermark is
a vendor- or customer-specific attribute, embedded into the design. It does not impact
functionality but its existence can easily be verified by the vendor. Consequently, the
vendor is able to analyze products on the market for license violations. However, since
such a watermark is often a static part of the design (c.f. [3, 4]) or mostly disconnected
from the rest of the circuitry (c.f. [5]), it can be found by leveraging these properties and
subsequently removed by reverse engineers. To counter such removal attacks and harden
against reverse engineering in general, designers can use obfuscation methods.
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Obfuscation in general transforms a product to hide implementation details from
reverse engineers while providing functional equivalence. However, obfuscation often
negatively impacts performance. For example, Chakraborty et al. applied their technique
HARPOON [6] to the ISCAS-89 benchmark suite [7], which increased area by 12.44% and
power consumption by 12.81% on average. Since these penalties influence sales, either
weak methods are used or no obfuscation is employed at all, with designers arguing that
the size of the design makes reversing already infeasible. Strong obfuscation techniques
which can be implemented at negligible costs and with minimal effort could incentivize
designers to protect their designs, effectively reducing the amount of information which is
plainly available to attackers.
A basic building block in software obfuscation is called opaque predicate. An opaque
predicate realizes a function that provides a constant Boolean output known to the designer,
but which is difficult to deduce during static analysis. Opaque predicates can be used,
for example, to harden control flow analysis. However, in hardware obfuscation, such
a building block is still missing. To the best of our knowledge, there has been only a
single prior work on dedicated hardware opaque predicates which was shown to be easily
detectable and removable (c.f. Section 2.3).
Many hardware designs incorporate constant control or data signals on HDL level that
are worth of protection (e.g. for nominal-actual comparison in sensors or cryptographic key
material). Even though such constant signals may be partially merged into surrounding
circuitry by optimization during synthesis, fragmentary information resides which can be
leveraged for reverse engineering. For example, comparison circuitry that evaluates to
true/false for only one input can be realized with fewer gates than a comparator that is
true/false for more than one input, which allows a reverse engineer for easier detection
and logical function recovery. Thus, obfuscating valuable constant signals on HDL level
is not only desirable for decreasing the attack surface for reverse engineers, but also for
obscuring the functionality of the design post-synthesis.
Contribution: In this work we present stealthy opaque predicates for hardware, a basic
building block to obfuscate constant signals. To this end we discuss criteria for strong
opaque predicates, most notably stealthiness. Our technique is independent of the hardware
platform (Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) or Field Programmable Gate
Array (FPGA)), requires minimal effort by the designer, and is applicably to the majority
of all hardware designs. We present two implementation strategies, of which one introduces
zero additional gates for the instantiation and no additional latency. Furthermore, we
evaluate our technique in two malicious case studies, where we obfuscate backdoors in
two cryptographic designs on an FPGA, and demonstrate minimal increases in Look-up
table (LUT) and Flip Flop (FF) usage without impacting latency. Finally, we explain how
our opaque predicates can be used to mitigate a known removal attack on a watermarking
scheme.
Outline: This work is structured as follows: Section 2 provides information on opaque
predicates and gives a brief overview on related work in software research. We also
define requirements for our opaque predicates and explain our adversarial model. In
Section 3 we explain the general idea behind our opaque predicates, before we present
two implementation strategies in Section 4. A practical evaluation of the impact on area
and latency of our implementation strategies is given in Section 4.3. In the end, we show
how our opaque predicates can be used to defend a watermarking scheme from a known
removal attack in Section 5 before concluding our work in Section 6.
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2 Background
2.1 Static and Dynamic Analysis
When analyzing a product, two general strategies exist, namely (1) static analysis and (2)
dynamic analysis. While static analysis investigates the product without any interaction,
dynamic analysis is performed while the product is operating. In software reverse engineer-
ing, static analysis focuses on the binary or source code, while the code is executed during
dynamic analysis. For hardware reverse engineering, static analysis processes images of a
delayered chip, a netlist, or HDL description, while the hardware is in addition also simu-
lated or actually run in dynamic analysis. The terms are sometimes used interchangeably
with offline- and online-analysis.
2.2 Opaque Predicates
Software research has dedicated a lot of effort to opaque predicates. However, the concept
of opaque predicates in hardware has barely been approached yet. In general, an opaque
predicate is a function which has a constant Boolean output, regardless of the input. This
behavior and the constant output is known to the designer, but non-obvious to an observer.
If such a function is found as an expression for a condition in code, static analysis tools
cannot be sure which branch is taken. An example for a simple opaque predicate is the
equation x(x+ 1) ?= 0 mod 2 which resolves to true for all possible x. Thus, in software,
opaque predicates are primarily used for control flow obfuscation. In hardware, opaque
predicates can be used, for example, to obfuscate control signals, constant values, or
connections to GND or VCC.
Collberg et al. published multiple works on software obfuscation using opaque predicates
[8, 9, 10, 11]. Especially their work from 1998 [11] laid the foundation to formalize and
evaluate the effectiveness of software opaque predicates. In the aforementioned paper,
the authors present a Java code obfuscator and measure deobfuscation resilience of the
generated output. The main purpose of their obfuscator was to harden control flow analysis
by inserting suitable opaque predicates into if statements and loop conditions. In other
words, it tried to make a control flow graph as obscure as possible. To this end, they
presented a variety of techniques to instantiate opaque predicates based on mathematical
expressions, as in the example above, pointer equivalence, and concurrency.
Collberg et al. stated that the quality of obfuscation can be described by four criteria:
the amount of obscurity added to the program (potency), the difficulty to break for an
automatic deobfuscator (resilience), the computational overhead added by the obfuscation
(cost) and how well the obfuscation blends in with the existing code (stealthiness). We
will stick to this terminology when evaluating our own approach. However, these terms
describe evaluation metrics for software obfuscation. In the following, we briefly explain
how these terms translate to hardware designs.
Potency. The meaning of potency transforms directly to hardware designs. It indi-
cates how incomprehensible a design becomes, regarding the target(s) of the obfuscation
technique.
Cost. In software, computational overhead describes longer execution time induced by
additional lines of code. This transfers only partially to hardware, because computations
are often done in parallel. Thus, changes to a design may have no influence on the latency
of a design. In addition, area is typically a more crucial cost factor in hardware designs
than code size in software. Therefore, cost in hardware measures the overhead in area and
latency.
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Resilience. According to Collberg et al., stealthiness is the property of how well an
obfuscation blends in with existing code to the “human eye”, i.e. manual inspection,
and resilience measures the difficulty of automated deobfuscation. In software analysis,
powerful tools exist which automate a majority of the reverse engineering process, hence
their output is a suitable indication for resilience. Dedicated algorithms and intermediate
results of the automated tools, for example control flow graphs, give a lot of information for
manual inspection to the engineer, making stealthiness assessable. Therefore, a separation
of stealth and resilience makes sense in software.
Regarding hardware, to the best of our knowledge, no publicly available netlist analysis
tool with focus on reverse engineering exists. In 2018, Fyrbiak et al. presented HAL,
an interactive graph-based netlist analysis tool which enables partial automation of the
reversing process and supports the reverse engineers via a dynamic plugin system [12].
However, HAL is not yet available as an open-source project. Thus, the majority of the
hardware reversing process is still performed manually. Automated deobfuscation can
only take place after the manual reversing process revealed the obfuscated parts. Hence,
with resilience in hardware we address the difficulty of automated deobfuscation after
identification.
Note that once an opaque predicate is detected, it can be further analyzed in order to
disclose the constant output. Since this step is isolated from the remaining hardware, we
expect the complexity, i.e. the resilience, to be low in the general case, especially when
aided by tools like HAL. Therefore, we prioritize stealthiness when evaluating our opaque
predicates.
Stealthiness. As mentioned in the previous paragraph, netlist reverse engineering is
mainly performed manually, which in turn makes quantifying stealthiness in hardware
even harder. The human factor, i.e. the individual approach of each engineer, is an
unquantifiable variable that determines processing speed, reversing skill level, and
success rate. In psychological research, first studies were conducted to examine how human
beings engage in reverse engineering. Lee et al. had participants deduce the functionality
of miniature circuits, for example the functionality of an AND-gate, from a gamified setup
with a light bulb and switches [13]. While such studies are an important first step, results
are currently too limited to provide quantifiable insights on the human factor in reverse
engineering. Therefore, while it is reasonable to demand high stealthiness from strong
opaque predicates, we can only argue the existence of this property for a technique, but
we cannot prove it.
Software programmers have a large degree of freedom when writing code. Even a bunch
of additional instructions does not raise suspicion as long as it appears like other code in
the project. Especially instructions related to function calls, math, or Boolean algebra look
just like genuine instructions. In hardware, due to the focus on saving area, extensions to
a design are quickly discovered if they lead to a strong deviation from expected size, i.e.
there is a correlation with the cost metric. Since the main functionalities of a design are
usually known to the reverse engineer, he also has an idea about the included building
blocks. Additional logical modules in the design can raise suspicion and might lead to
identification of obfuscated parts. Thus, in hardware, stealthiness describes blending not
only with genuine circuitry (i.e. code in software), but also with logical modules.
Collberg et al. also highlighted the context-sensitivity of this metric, as an obfuscation
which is regarded stealthy in one project can be highly unstealthy in other projects. This
directly transfers to hardware.
2.3 Previous Work on Opaque Predicates in Hardware
In 2011 Meyer-Bäse et al. implemented the predicates of Collberg et al. in Verilog and
VHDL, but they did not introduce new constructions [14]. While many publications exist
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that target opaque predicates in software, we are only aware of a single work regarding
dedicated hardware opaque predicates. It was presented in 2014 by Sergeichik et al. [15].
Their approach was to include additional free-running Linear Feedback Shift Registers
(LFSRs) into the design. An LFSR always has a Hamming weight larger than zero,
regardless of its current state. Thus, by feeding all bits of the LFSR into an OR gate,
the authors generated a constant 1 signal (or 0 signal by using a NOR gate), while the
internal LFSR state was constantly changing. However, the technique is attackable
because it violates the aforementioned requirement of high stealthiness regarding the
logical component. LFSRs where all state bits are OR-ed together blend in well with
existing circuitry since they are not introducing major overhead in area. Nevertheless, this
logical structure is highly uncommon in hardware designs as it has no other purpose than
providing a constant signal. Exploiting this property, Wallat et al. presented a practical
removal attack on the opaque predicates by Sergeichik et al. in 2017 [16]. They searched
for the special LFSR structure in a netlist and replaced it with a connection to GND or
VCC, in a fully automated fashion.
2.4 Threat Model
We assume the same threat model as prior research on hardware analysis [17, 6, 18, 19, 20].
The adversary, i.e. reverse engineer, has full access to a flattened gate-level netlist. He
knows the general functionality and is aware of the input and output specifications, but
has no knowledge on internal workings. His goal is to (1) identify the obfuscated element,
(2) analyze, and (3) deobfuscate it. We emphasize that we especially focus on adversaries
which employ static analysis to reverse a design, as this is what opaque predicates are
designed to protect against. However, in Section 3.1 we argue that our construction even
remains stealthy to some extend when faced with dynamic analysis.
Regardless of the employed analysis strategy, an adversary breaks an obfuscation if
he succeeds in the third step, i.e. he is able to look through the obscurity added by the
obfuscation. For example, he may want to replace an obfuscated module with a plain
equivalent or extract implementation details from an obfuscated design. To this end, he
has to (partially) reverse engineer relevant logical modules in both control and data path.
Note that an “adversary” not necessarily has to be malicious. A designer who tries to
detect obfuscated backdoors is also included in our definition.
As demonstrated for numerous settings, it is realistic to assume that the adversary has
access to a flattened gate-level netlist: It can be extracted at chip-level or via layout reverse
engineering [21, 22] in the case of ASICs, via bitstream-level reverse engineering [23, 24]
in the case of FPGAs, or is obtained directly from the IP provider [18].
We emphasize that - given infinite resources - reverse engineering always succeeds,
simply because obfuscation must not strip functionality from the design. This is also
formalized in the impossibility result for perfect obfuscation by Barak et al. [25]. However,
the cost in both time and effort can quickly grow to extents where reverse engineering is
regarded as practically infeasible. Due to the amount of unknown variables in a design, i.e.
the number of gates and the lack of in-depth knowledge on design specifics, we assume that
reverse engineering of the full design is out of scope. In fact, any obfuscation technique
would be broken in this case.
2.5 Requirements
Our technique is applicable to the majority of all designs. The only requirement is that
it has to include a counter or Finite State Machine (FSM). We will make use of already
existing modules in order to minimize costs. With more instances of FSMs or counters in
the design stealthiness and resilience of our approach increases. We regard this requirement
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as rather weak, since most IP-cores contain such building blocks with the exception of, for
example, fully combinatorial or pipelined designs.
3 Our Construction
In this section we explain the high-level idea behind our opaque predicates before we give
detailed implementation strategies in Section 4.
The goal of our construction is to substitute constant signals with obfuscated constants
which are difficult to detect via static analysis: An obfuscated constant may change its
value arbitrarily throughout the operation of the device, but has a known and stable value
at certain periods in time. In order to achieve high stealthiness, we identify and leverage
suitable existing signals or introduce small additional circuitry which we connect to the
places where the stable value is needed.
In software, everything which is not affected by the current line of code is static.
Hardware, however, runs in parallel, and signals in the design may change all the time.
The value of a signal is only evaluated if the data or control port it reaches is active, for
example the data port of an enabled FF. Therefore, this dynamic switching behavior does
not impact functionality if connected ports are deactivated, which is done by control logic.
Consequently, the utilization of obfuscated constants does not change functionality if the
stable value is hold as long as succeeding ports are active. We call this period where the
original value has to be available to maintain functionality processing period.
The main idea to achieve our goal is to use the state registers of FSMs or counters as
opaque predicates. Note that these are frequent elements in IP-cores, so their inclusion
itself does not raise suspicion in contrast to the construction of Sergeichik et al. [15] (c.f.
Section 2.3). This also explains our requirement that the original circuit has to include
such elements.
FSMs and counters are elements that transition between states based on certain
conditions, for example a trigger signal or the previous state. During the time where no
condition is met, the register which encodes the state does not change. This lays the
foundation of our opaque predicates since there are existing elements that have known
values at certain periods of operation. We use such a state register to generate obfuscated
constants.
Since FSMs generate sequences of states analogously to counters which generate
sequences of numbers, FSMs can be regarded as counters with non-numeric counting
styles. For the sake of simplicity we restrict our explanations and examples to FSMs in the
following, but emphasize that presented techniques are similarly applicable to any kind of
counters.
Since the sequence of states in an FSM cannot be changed without altering device
functionality, the designer has to select a suitable FSM to ensure a stable signal during
the processing period.
Example Figure 1 shows a small example. FSM1 controls FSM2 which in turn controls
a computation. After the computation is done, FSM1 triggers transmission of the result.
This process is repeated indefinitely.
If a constant expression is only required by logic which is active in the Work1, Work2,
and Work3 states of FSM2, there are two options to instantiate an opaque predicate: Over
the whole processing period, FSM1 remains in the Wait state, i.e. the value of the state
register is constant and can be used as an opaque predicate. FSM2 passes Work1, Work2,
and Work3, so all FFs of the state register of FSM2 which do not change in these states
can also be used to generate the constant expression.
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FSM1 FSM2
Resetstart
Wait
Send
Init
Work1
Work2
Work3
Done
reset signal
done signal
Figure 1: Visualization of two FSMs which can be used as opaque predicates.
3.1 Discussion
We discuss the potential of our opaque predicates according to the criteria originally
proposed by Collberg et al. (c.f. Section 2.2). Furthermore we elaborate on the strength
of our opaque predicates when faced with dynamic analysis and inspect the applicability
of known techniques against software opaque predicates to our approach.
Potency. With respect to potency, after applying our approach the constant signal is
entirely gone when simply “reading” the design, i.e. flattened gate-level netlist. Therefore,
regarding the goal of obfuscating constant signals, we introduce maximum obscurity.
Cost. In terms of cost, we do not introduce any additional gates on HDL level when
using existing FSMs. Depending on the actual instantiation, additional wires are required.
However, as we show in our case studies in Section 4.3, the synthesis toolchain will add
a small number of additional gates, for signal routing and since previous optimization
is not possible anymore. For example, an AND gate where one input is constant can be
optimized by the compiler, but as soon as both inputs seem variable, no optimization can
be performed and the gate has to be instantiated as is.
Stealthiness. As we argued in Section 2.2, stealthiness cannot be quantified easily.
Therefore, the best we can do is to present arguments why our opaque predicates are
stealthy. Since we utilize existing circuitry, the approach is stealthy in a sense that minimal
additional gates and no new FFs are introduced. Intuitively, this leads to no unusual
structures in contrast to the approach by Sergeichik et al. (c.f. Section 2.3). Our building
blocks, FSMs and counters, are common in IP-cores, so their existence is not suspicious
either. Since an FSM controls logical modules of a core depending on its current state,
signals that reach from a state register into the design are unobtrusive. Even signals from
state registers which are connected to the data inputs of FFs are common in circuits, as
can be seen in our two case studies, which we present in detail in Section 4.3. We counted
the FF instances, where the combinatorial circuit which generated the FF’s data input had
at least one FSM signal as input in relation to all FFs which receive any signal generated
via an FSM. For our (small) PRESENT case study we identified 28.79% of all FFs, for
our larger RSA case study we identified 37.62%. Thus, a reverse engineer cannot use this
property to immediately identify obfuscation instances.
Therefore, if an adversary is looking for opaque predicates in general, we are confident
that our technique will go unnoticed. Furthermore, by generating a signal from multiple
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opaque predicates, i.e. the state registers of multiple FSMs, the original functionality
becomes obstructed even more. In that case, multiple individual components, which are
not related in the first place, contribute to the signal generation, thus requiring a reverse
engineer to analyze an even bigger part of the circuit.
However, even if an adversary is looking especially for our opaque predicates we
argue that this is only successful with tremendous efforts. We stress that, while efficient
algorithms exist to extract FSMs from a gate-level netlist as shown by Shi et al. [26], this
step is not the major difficulty in detecting our opaque predicates. As mentioned before,
FSMs naturally control other circuitry. These control signals are outputs of the state
register. The adversary would have to reverse engineer the whole datapath of the logical
modules which are controlled by the analyzed FSM to detect that a processed signal is
actually constant. To this end, he would also have to deduce the processing period. We
stress that all this additional information, which is required to successfully detect our
opaque predicates, tremendously increases the required reversing effort.
Several approaches exist to make sense of a circuits datapath. In 2012, Shi et al.
presented an automated technique to extract functional modules from a circuit [27], by first
stripping all FSMs from it and subsequently matching subcircuits against abstract models.
At the same time Li et al. developed a technique based on behavioral patterns to generate
a high-level description of unknown circuits [28]. Note that this technique uses dynamic
analysis. One year later, Li et al. presented another technique to automatically detect
word-level [29]. Extending on this technique, Subramanyan et al. automated extraction of
registers and adders [30, 31] and Gascón et al. improved bit-order reversing using template
matching [32]. However, all of these techniques only help in recovering modules of the
datapath. Making sense of interconnections and, regarding our construction, identifying
processing periods, still has to be performed manually and in conjunction with the control
logic. Consequently, we regard our opaque predicates as stealthy.
Resilience. As noted in Section 2.2, resilience in hardware becomes important once an
obfuscation has been identified, i.e. after stealthiness failed. If an adversary manages to
confidently identify an instance of our opaque predicates including the processing period,
deobfuscation is straightforward. By simulating the FSM in isolation, i.e. applying a
very restricted dynamic analysis, the constant value during the processing period can be
disclosed. Therefore, our approach features low resilience.
Dynamic Analysis. As noted in Section 2.2 and Section 2.4, opaque predicates are
designed to defend against static analysis. However, we want to shortly argue why our
construction also offers potential when faced with dynamic analysis. Since dynamic analysis
allows for inspection during design operation via simulation or execution, an adversary
would be able to detect signals which do not switch in certain periods of time. However,
this is also (partially) normal behavior of control signals. Since the FSMs which are used
as opaque predicates also control other parts of the circuit, their signals naturally remain
constant for certain periods of time, for example to enable parts of a circuit or to act as
state-dependent bitmasks. Hence, while identifying gates which receive a constant input
over a certain duration is possible with dynamic analysis, they do not necessarily have
to be the target of an opaque predicate. Therefore, dynamic analysis is only capable of
narrowing the parts of the datapath which have to be analyzed to those including the
identified FFs, but does not instantly break our construction.
Techniques Against Software Opaque Predicates. Multiple approaches exist to attack
software opaque predicates. For example, Dalla et al. presented an attack based on dynamic
analysis to identify software opaque predicates of the form f(x) = 0 mod y [33]. They
observe conditional jumps over a number of executions and propose a technique based
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on abstract interpretation to detect opaque predicates in these conditions. Ming et al.
presented LOOP, a Logic-Oriented Opaque Predicate detection tool using static analysis
after a symbolic execution [34]. To this end, they examine all conditions on the execution
path, both in isolation as well as in conjunction to detect correlated predicates.
In general, approaches that target software opaque predicates all share a common
structure. First, they identify branch conditions and then further evaluate/compare
satisfiability of these conditions in order to identify opaque predicates. This is a well suited
approach in software since opaque predicates are used for control flow obfuscation and do
not impact other computations.
We stress that this general approach cannot be plainly transferred to hardware circuits.
In software, control flow is observable from conditional branches, but data flow is obscure
by the nature of pointers, while in hardware data flow is observable from wires and
combinatorial logic between FFs, but control flow is obscure because of state machines.
Note that understanding the data flow is distinct from understanding the meaning of the
datapath in hardware, it only describes where information goes, not what it means. Our
construction, reuses existing signals which are also used at multiple other places in the
circuit, i.e. there is no isolated use for obfuscation. Therefore, from our point of view,
techniques against software opaque predicates cannot be applied to our opaque predicates.
4 Implementation Strategies
In this section we present two implementation strategies. The first one explains in detail
how an existing state machine can be used as an opaque predicate. The second strategy
can be used if no existing state machine or counter is suitable for the first method.
4.1 Implementation in Existing Circuitry
In order to use an existing FSM as an opaque predicate the designer has to analyze which
of the available state registers are suitable. He first has to identify the processing period
T , consisting of starting event and duration of the constant to obfuscate. He then has
to verify that the FSM passes the same set of states S during each iteration of T . If S
changes for several occurrences of T , the respective FSM cannot be used as an opaque
predicate. This can be the case, for example, if the FSM is independent of the circuitry
which processes the constant. If the set of passed states is stable for each iteration of T ,
the state machine is a valid candidate.
After selecting a valid candidate the designer has to configure the state encoding of
the FSM. The encodings of all states not in S can be chosen arbitrarily. For all states
in S, encodings have to be selected where at least one common bit remains constant.
Consequently, the outputs of the corresponding FFs remain constant during T and can be
used to generate the signals of an obfuscated constant.
Using this implementation strategy no additional FFs and no combinatorial gates
are added to the design. However, as becomes evident in the case studies in Section 4.3
additional gates may be inferred due to optimization issues.
Example. An FSM with a 5-bit state register (FF4, . . . ,FF0) is used as an opaque
predicate to generate the 7-bit constant (C6, . . . , C0) = 11010002. The designer identified
that during period T where the constant is required the FSM consistently passes three
states that form the set S. He encodes them as follows: S = (101002, 110002, 111002).
Therefore, he can use FF4, FF1, and FF0 which constantly output 1, 0 and 0 during T to
generate the obfuscated constant. In the remaining states of the FSM those bits are not
fixed and therefore the output appears to have dynamic behavior. A possible instantiation
would be to connect these FFs as shown in Figure 2.
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FF4
Q
D
FF3
Q
D
FF2
Q
D
FF1
Q
D
FF0
Q
D
C6 C5 C4 C3 C2 C1 C0
Transition Logic
Figure 2: Exemplary constant generation from a state register.
4.2 Implementation with Additional Circuitry
If the designer is in a situation where none of the existing FSMs or counters offer a stable
set S during the processing period, he can still make use of our general idea. This situation
can for example occur if the design consists of independent FSMs where the state sequence
during the processing period changes depending on external events. In this section we
describe an implementation strategy which adds a small number of gates and FFs in order
to create a module that looks like a genuine FSM. However, the new FSM will reach a
known stable state after a number of clock cycles, thus providing constant values after the
initial delay. The designer only has to add the FSM to the design and connect the reset
signal to be triggered at a point which is far enough ahead of the processing period. Note
that generating an FSM which cycles a known sequence of states during the processing
period is highly difficult in this scenario. In the best case, we are only able to give a lower
bound for the time difference between reset and processing period. By making sure that
the additional FSM is in its stable state simply before the processing period is reached, we
do not have to care for varying amounts of time after FSM reset.
The difficulty in generating this opaque predicate is that we have to find interconnections
for the state register’s FFs which result in a stabilization from a known starting value,
i.e. the reset value, to a known stable value after a known number of clock cycles. We
present two algorithmic approaches which lead to three algorithms QM, QMX, and RND
that automatically generate such interconnections. They require the register size n and
start/reset value s as input as well as a stabilization delay t. The algorithms output the
stable state z and the corresponding function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n which represents the
interconnections. Note that all algorithms can be adjusted to regard the input t as a lower
bound tmin and internally select a random t ≥ tmin. In that case, the actual stabilization
delay t becomes an additional output.
The transition function of the FSM during each clock cycle is then described by the
function F : {0, 1}n × {0, 1} → {0, 1}n where
F (x,RST ) =
{
s RST = 1
f(x) else
i.e. one clock cycle in the hardware implementation updates the register from state x to
state f(x) or resets the register if required. In the following we first present the three
algorithms before comparing their outputs.
Approach 1: Quine-McCluskey Supported Generation. Our first approach chooses a
random sequence of states and utilizes Boolean algebra to generate an according transition
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function f . The chosen sequence X = (xi)0≤i≤t+1 is of length t + 2, where x0 is set to
s and x1, . . . , xt−1 are chosen randomly such that no state appears twice. The two final
states in the sequence have to be equal, i.e. xt = xt+1. When f is generated based on X,
it outputs said sequence, thus f(xi) = xi+1 holds and subsequently f(xt) = xt+1 = xt, i.e.
the function stabilizes after t clock cycles in state z = xt.
We use the Quine-McCluskey algorithm to generate minimized Boolean functions for
each bit separately [35]. The Quine-McCluskey algorithm basically transforms a truth
table into the corresponding Boolean function. The truth table can also contain so called
“don’t care states” where the output is irrelevant for the respective input values. The
algorithm requires a set of values which shall result in a 1 at the output and the “don’t
care states”. It then returns a Boolean function in Disjunctive Normal Form (DNF) which
outputs a 1 for all specified inputs, either 1 or 0 for all “don’t care” values and a 0 for all
other inputs. In our case, all states which are not in the sequence are “don’t care states”.
The original Quine-McCluskey algorithm outputs a function in DNF, i.e. it only uses
AND, OR, and NOT gates. However, modifications exist which also make use of XOR gates. In
the following, we refer to the above algorithm that uses the original Quine-McCluskey as
QM and to the one using the XOR-enhanced variant as QMX.
Approach 2: Randomized Generation. In contrast to our first approach, the second one
generates a random transition function f for an n-bit state register and then simulates
the sequence of generated states in order to determine suitability. The algorithm, further
denoted as RND, also processes each bit individually when generating f . For each FF in the
register, it first selects a random subset I of all other FFs of said register, where |I| ≥ 2
has to be ensured. The output signals of all FFs in I are put through an inverter stage
where a randomly selected subset is negated. The output signals of the inverter stage are
then passed as inputs to an OR, AND, or XOR gate, which is again randomly selected. The
output of that gate is the output bit of f , which is used to update the currently processed
FF. An exemplary interconnection for a single FF of a 5-bit state register (FF4, . . . ,FF0)
as generated by this algorithm is shown in Figure 3. In this case I = {FF0,FF2,FF3} was
chosen, the output of FF0 was selected to be the input of a NOT gate in the inverter stage,
and an OR gate was instantiated to finally combine the signals.
FF0
FF1
FF2
FF3
FF4
Inverter Stage
output
Figure 3: Exemplary interconnection as generated by the RND algorithm.
After generating f as described above, simulation starts at state s and simulates until
a stable state z is found. If the number of clock cycles until f stabilizes in state z is ≥ t,
the algorithm outputs f and z. Otherwise a new function f is chosen and the process is
repeated.
Discussion. Our algorithms tackle the same task from different directions. While QM
and QMX take a bottom-up approach of selecting a state sequence and generating the
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Table 1: Comparison of additional gates required for the interconnections of state register
FFs.
n 3 4 5
t 2 3 5 2 3 5 10 2 3 5 10
QM
#not 2.6 2.9 3.0 3.5 3.8 4.0 4.0 4.3 4.7 5.0 5.0
#and 3.8 4.3 6.1 6.7 8.3 12.8 24.6 10.0 13.6 22.0 45.7
#or 5.1 5.4 5.3 9.5 11.3 13.7 16.0 14.6 19.0 25.2 34.5
#xor 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
QMX
#not 1.9 2.4 2.9 2.3 3.0 3.9 5.4 2.3 3.3 4.5 6.9
#and 0.7 1.4 3.0 0.8 1.8 4.8 13.5 0.9 2.2 6.6 20.9
#or 5.1 5.6 5.9 9.1 11.3 15.0 21.6 13.4 18.3 26.5 43.7
#xor 1.8 1.9 2.3 3.2 4.0 5.8 9.0 4.9 6.8 10.8 19.0
RND
#not 2.4 2.5 - 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.0 4.3 4.2 4.2 4.1
#and 1.3 1.2 - 2.3 2.2 1.8 0.8 3.7 3.5 3.0 1.8
#or 1.7 1.8 - 3.6 3.6 3.8 4.1 5.8 6.0 6.2 6.8
#xor 0.5 0.5 - 1.3 1.5 1.9 3.3 2.3 2.6 3.3 4.9
corresponding transition function, RND takes the top-down approach of selecting a transition
function and verifying its suitability.
Since opaque predicates are generated during the design process, we regard runtime
as an insignificant property of our algorithms. For the sake of completeness we shortly
elaborate on the respective expected execution times. For a truth table with k entries
Quine-McCluskey terminates after O(3k ln(k)) steps (worst-case), therefore QM and QMX
terminate in a similar amount of steps. Since RND solves the same problem, it terminates as
well, but accurate runtime estimations are difficult because of its random nature. According
to our experiments, if t gets closer to 2n, the maximum number of states an n-bit register
can encode, the random search can become very long.
All three algorithms have to add additional circuitry, namely n FFs and the gates
required to realize f . Table 1 shows the amount of gates each algorithm requires to
generate f , averaged over 1000 executions for each parameter set. Since f is generated
independently for each FF, there may be common terms in the Boolean functions. While a
compiler could optimize this during synthesis, we employed a postprocessing step directly
on f to extract common terms which have to only be computed once in order to get a
fair comparison in Table 1. We explain the parameter choices later when we extend on
stealthiness, as both topics are related.
For the RND algorithm we did not compute values for n = 3, t = 5. With n = 3 only
8 states are possible and randomly finding f that stabilize after ≥ 5 clock cycles took
minutes to hours, while results of the first hundred iterations indicated no different behavior
compared to the other inputs. It is easy to see that RND introduces fewer additional gates
than the output of the Quine-McCluskey supported algorithms. Furthermore, the amount
of gates required for RND is mainly influenced by the choice of n while for QM and QMX n
and t both notably impact the gate count. The advantage of RND becomes more significant
for bigger values of n and t.
All algorithms can be tweaked to use different strategies for handling the input t, as
for example it could be interpreted as a lower bound tmin for additional randomness.
However, RND offers additional degrees of freedom for the actual implementation: When
generating a random f , the strategy of creating connections can be adapted, e.g. more or
less inputs can be considered for each bit or multiple gates can be inserted. The output of
the Quine-McCluskey method is always in DNF, a structure where numerous AND gates
are input to OR gates. An FSM where the state transition logic is in DNF structure could
offer an anchor point for detection to a reverse engineer.
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This leads to our conclusion that the randomized generation returns much smaller
and thus more natural, i.e. more stealthy, interconnections and can be customized to a
larger extend than the Quine-McCluskey supported generation. Therefore, we regard the
randomized approach as the algorithm of choice.
We stress that regardless of the employed algorithm, there is a stabilization delay.
Depending on the point in time where the reset signal is triggered, the designer might have
to infer an artificial delay to ensure that the FSM stabilized before the processing period.
Stealthiness and Parameter Choice. Since we add new circuitry to the existing design
with this approach, stealthiness is lower than for the first variant. Still the inclusion of
an additional FSM in a design with multiple benign FSMs is not suspicious in the first
place. In order to integrate the FSM into the whole design and not make it appear as an
outsider, it should be reset by other state machines. That way it gets integrated into the
control hierarchy and blends in better than an autonomous module. To further improve
similarities with existing FSMs, parameters n and t should be selected to output FSMs
which do not vastly differ from other FSMs in the design in terms of size. For example
could an FSM with a 15-bit state register be suspicious in a design where each module only
has a low amount of logical states. Because of this Table 1 was created with n ∈ {3, 4, 5}
as these were common FSM register sizes we experienced.
Stealthiness is only barely affected by t. Even for small values, the generated intercon-
nections are not suspicious during static analysis. Only during simulation, i.e. dynamic
analysis, larger values mean that the stabilizing behavior will occur later. Therefore, the
designer can select a value of t which allows for easy integration. To map this property we
selected arbitrary values in Table 1 to only analyze the impact on additional gates.
Static analysis, presented with a gate-level netlist, cannot determine from the wiring
that the FSM produces a stable signal after a number of clock cycles from reset. Only via
simulation this behavior becomes evident. However, even if this property is uncovered, the
opaque predicate is not immediately identified as such. FSMs often control a sequence
of operations before idling in a Done state, i.e. even genuine FSMs may stabilize in a
certain state. In order to actually identify our opaque predicate FSMs, still further reverse
engineering of the influenced datapath is required, immensely increasing the attacker’s
efforts.
The technique with additional circuitry introduces some potential weaknesses. The new
FSM is mostly self-contained, i.e. only the reset is performed by external control signals.
While such FSMs can be a normal part of some circuits, they might be a suspicious module
in others, resulting in a comparable weakness to the approach of Sergeichik et al. [15] (c.f.
Section 2.3). However, without further inspection our modules still look just like genuine
FSMs in the general case and require an adversary to invest additional effort to detect.
We therefore conclude that our opaque predicates with additional circuitry still remain
stealthy, although they are weaker than our opaque predicates in existing circuitry.
4.3 Practical Evaluation
In order to evaluate the costs of our opaque predicates, we observe the change in the
number of LUTs and FFs when applying our two implementation strategies to FPGA
designs. To this end we implemented two case studies where we obfuscate Trojans in
cryptographic cores with our techniques to harden against detection via reverse engineering.
Designers are afraid of purposely implemented backdoors in designs since the crypto wars
in the 1990s and this fear has been rekindled by the Snowden revelations in 2013. Hence
we regard this scenario as a realistic target for obfuscation.
The first case study targets a PRESENT encryption core with input triggered Trojan
and the second case study an RSA core, subverted with a kleptographic backdoor. Although
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we executed our case studies on FPGAs, our technique is in no way exclusive to this
architecture but can also be used on ASICs.
Our expectations are that for the instantiation in existing circuitry, we observe no
change in the number of LUTs and FFs while for the approach with additional circuitry,
the amount of FFs increases by n and the amount of LUTs slightly increases because of
the feedback logic and routing.
In the following we briefly introduce the designs before presenting the measurement
results.
4.3.1 Trojanized PRESENT
The first case study features a trojanized PRESENT encryption core as illustrated in
Figure 4. The general Trojan idea is similar to the design in [23]. When active, the Trojan
replaces the user-supplied key with a fixed embedded key. To an observer, the output still
looks encrypted, and multiple infected devices still successfully communicate. The scenario
that multiple devices are infected is likely, if the Trojan is included in the IP-core that was
used when designing the device family.
Thus, with knowledge of the trigger and the fixed key, an attacker can decrypt and
manipulate any traffic. The Trojan is input-toggled, i.e. once the trigger plaintext is
received the Trojan stays active until it is presented a second time with the trigger plaintext.
Note that this Trojan can be used by anyone who has knowledge of the trigger value and
the fixed key, so the attacker does not have to be the Trojan designer. We use opaque
predicates to obfuscate the fixed key and the trigger value. We emphasize, that this
protects only the constant key and trigger value, not the Trojan or its trigger mechanism
itself, against detection. For example, Trojan detection techniques such as MERO by
Chakraborty et al. [36] still apply. Via statistical extraction of rarely active paths and
automatic test pattern generation (ATPG) the goal of MERO is to generate a minimal
test set which stimulates each of these rare paths multiple times. During dynamic analysis,
while feeding the inputs of that test set, triggering a Trojan is highly probable. Regardless
of our opaque predicates, this approach would still detect our Trojan. Intuitively, an
obfuscation technique which transforms rarely active paths to paths with high activity
could potentially defend against detection via tools like MERO. We leave this as an open
question for further research.
PRESENT?= Trigger T-FF
Fixed Key
Key
Plaintext
Figure 4: Visualization of the Trojanized PRESENT core.
Obfuscation Impact. Since we protected the constant values in the design, we focus on
an reverse engineer who tries to extract the trigger value and the fixed key or performs a
quick scan for information which hints unexpected constant values in the original HDL
code. For example, in order to find the trigger value, the reverse engineer could scan for
comparators with fixed values. For the fixed key, he could search for an isolated control
signal which is spread to all data inputs of a register of the same size as the key. Our
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opaque predicates render any kind of attack ineffective which focuses on information
introduced by constants in HDL code. For example, the obfuscation forces the synthesis
toolchain to turn the comparator with a fixed value into a dynamic comparator, removing
any indication about a constant trigger value. The adversary could still find a comparator,
but to make sure that this is a fixed-input trigger or to extract the trigger value, further
reversing is required.
Implementation. We implemented the Trojan three times, once unobfuscated, i.e. as
depicted in 4, once using an existing FSM and once applying our strategy with additional
circuitry, generated via the RND algorithm. A simple UART core was added to handle I/O.
For the approach with additional circuitry, we generated an opaque predicate of size 3 bits
as this was the average size of FSM state registers in the design. We synthesized, placed
and routed the design for a Xilinx Artix 7 35T FPGA. The optimization strategy was set
to optimize for area and the design was fully flattened.
4.3.2 Subverted RSA
The second case study features an RSA core where key generation is subverted with a
kleptographic backdoor. Kleptography has been introduced by Young and Yung around
1996 [37, 38]. In recent years there has been numerous research which presents kleptographic
Trojans on cryptosystems [39, 40, 41, 42]. Kleptography describes the study of subliminally
and securely stealing information. The output of a device with a kleptographic Trojan
remains conform to specifications when observed with black-box access, but leaks sensitive
information exclusively to the Trojan designer. To this end, it asymmetrically encrypts
(parts of) the sensitive information with an embedded public key of the designer, leaking
this so called “kleptogram” over one or multiple outputs. In this case study we use our
opaque predicates to obfuscate such an embedded key.
We implemented our own kleptographic Trojan which replaces the key generation of
the RSA parameters (n, e, d) as shown in Algorithm 1. It uses the Trojan designer’s RSA
public key (Nadv, Eadv) to generate kleptograms. The advantage of this approach is that
kleptograms are generated without requiring any additional hardware modules. Only small
changes to the datapath and a single FSM were enough to subvert the original core. This
is a difference to existing kleptographic attacks on RSA, where additional modules, for
example a dedicated hash function, were required. However, our kleptographic Trojan only
works on RSA key generation where e is not fixed but randomly chosen.
Algorithm 1 Subverted RSA KeyGen
Input: 1λ
Output: pk = (n, e), sk = (d)
1: Choose p, q as random λ/2-bit primes
2: n← pq
3: e← pEadv mod Nadv
4: while gcd(e,Φ(n)) 6= 1 do
5: e← e+ 1
6: d← e−1 mod Φ(n)
7: return pk = (n, e), sk = (d)
Instead of randomly choosing the public exponent e, it is computed as e = pEadv
mod Nadv and then incremented until it is invertible modulo Φ(n). Subsequently, the
Trojan designer has to compute p′ = (e− i)Dadv mod Nadv for a small number of i, until
n is divisible by p′. Then he can factorize n as p = p′, q = n/p, break RSA, and thus
decrypt or even manipulate all ongoing communication.
16
Stealthy Opaque Predicates in Hardware - Obfuscating Constant Expressions at
Negligible Overhead
Obfuscation Impact. Note that in contrast to the PRESENT case study, our klepto-
graphic Trojan is always active. Techniques for Trojan detection often aim at finding
triggers or circuitry which is inactive most of the time (c.f. [36, 43, 44]) and are therefore
not capable of detecting kleptographic Trojans.
We try to protect against a reverse engineer who tries to detect a kleptographic Trojan
by using the knowledge that the design has to include the Trojan designer’s public key.
As the key pair (Nadv, Eadv) has to be included in the design, he could try to locate
constant signals which form a possible input to the exponentiation engine. We use an
opaque predicate to obfuscate Nadv and Eadv in order to harden against this detection
approach, as all inputs to the exponentiation engine now appear to be dynamic without
deep inspection.
Implementation. We selected an exemplary 256-bit RSA-core, capable of encryption,
decryption, and key generation. Again, we implemented the design three times: unobfus-
cated and once with each of our two techniques, using the RND algorithm for our approach
with additional circuitry. We use the same UART core as in the previous case study to
handle I/O. When applying our first implementation technique we used a single FSM
to generate both values Nadv and Eadv. For the approach with additional circuitry, we
generated an opaque predicate of size 5 bits as this was the average size of FSM state
registers in the design. We synthesized, placed and routed the design for a Xilinx Artix 7
35T FPGA, to get comparable results to the first case study. The optimization strategy
was set to optimize for area and the design was fully flattened.
4.3.3 Implementation Results
Table 2: Area comparison of our three case studies. Percentual changes refer to the
unobfuscated circuit.
Design LUTs FFs
PRESENT
Unobfuscated 304 347
Strategy 1 307 +0.99% 347 +0%
Strategy 2 304 +0% 350 +0.86%
RSA
Unobfuscated 10570 5316
Strategy 1 10811 +2.28% 5314 −0.04%
Strategy 2 10692 +1.15% 5323 +0.13%
Table 2 shows the results of our evaluation in terms of LUT and FF count. It contains
the absolute numbers for each variant of the two case studies as well as the relative increase
compared to the unobfuscated design. Strategy 1 refers to the implementation which uses
an existing FSM, and Strategy 2 to the one where new circuitry for the opaque predicate
is added. We confirmed manually that the additional circuitry remained untouched by
the synthesizing toolchain, which is another indicator that they are difficult to detect via
static analysis, since compiler optimization is based on the results of a static analysis.
For Strategy 2, we connected the reset signals of our opaque predicates to reset signals of
FSMs which were reset far earlier in both case studies. Therefore, our obfuscations have
no impact on latency as the opaque predicates had time to stabilize before the processing
period. Although Strategy 1 is expected to have no impact on area, as we solely use
existing circuitry, the number of LUTs increases by 0.99% for the PRESENT case study
and by 2.28% for the RSA core. We expect this increase to result from layout optimization
of the synthesis toolchain to fit the FPGA architecture. Regarding the amount of FFs,
our expectations are met, as no additional FFs were instantiated. In the RSA case study,
the optimizer managed to take advantage of the new connections and reduced the number
of FFs by 0.04% compared to the unobfuscated design.
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For Strategy 2 we expected a slight increase in both, FF and LUT count. For the
PRESENT case study there is an increase of exactly 3 FFs, i.e. the FFs which were
added for the opaque predicate. However, in the RSA case study, 7 new FFs were added,
although the opaque predicate only uses 5. We assume that the additional a FFs are
internal buffers, also inferred by the optimization tools. Surprisingly the amount of LUTs
did not increase for the PRESENT core. Apparently, the additional logic can be embedded
into underutilized LUTs. In the RSA case study the number of LUTs increases by 1.15%
which reflects our expectation, although the increase exceeds the required gates for the f
function.
Our evaluation shows that the theoretical expectations are not exactly met in reality.
Although the impact on the amount of FFs is as expected, the number of LUTs increases
more than anticipated. Optimizations applied by the synthesis toolchain heavily influence
the numbers. Note that the toolchain itself was not able to deduce that our construction
actually generates a constant value and did not replace it. While we did not achieve a
zero-overhead obfuscation using our implementation strategies, the results still attest very
low overhead.
5 Application to Watermarking
In the previous section we presented two case studies which focused on malicious application
of obfuscation techniques to hide a Trojan. In this section we present the theory of a
defensive application of our opaque predicates, where a designer tries to protect intellectual
property.
We apply our obfuscation to the watermarking scheme of Schmid et al. [4], effectively
rendering previous removal attacks ineffective. The watermarks of Schmid et al. are used
to protect IP-cores on LUT-based FPGAs and can be verified from the bitstream file that
is configuring the FPGA. The configuration of a LUT in the bitstream file defines the
output values for each input combination. Subsequently, for an n-to-1 bit LUT 2n bits are
required for configuration. The idea of Schmid et al. was to fix some inputs of a LUT to 0,
i.e. GND. Therefore, all input combination where those inputs would be 1 cannot occur
during operation. The bits in the LUT configuration which are intended to configure the
corresponding output bits are then used to encode a watermark. As watermarks may not
fit in one LUT configuration, it can be split over multiple LUTs.
An example is illustrated in Figure 5 which shows the truth table and resulting
configuration for a 4-to-1 LUT. The inputs I3 and I2 are fixed to GND, so only the input
combinations for the four bits labeled C can actually occur during operation. We marked
all other input combinations which cannot occur gray. For example, the input combination
(I3, . . . I0) = 1000 cannot occur as I3 is constantly 0. The 12 configuration bits that belong
to these inputs, labeled W, can be used to encode a watermark.
GND → I3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
GND → I2 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
I1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
I0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
output/config C C C C W W W W W W W W W W W W
Figure 5: Example of a 4-to-1 bit LUT configuration where the C bits are actual configura-
tion and the W bits can be used for watermarking.
The bitstream file used to configure the FPGA contains all LUT configurations and thus
the watermark’s existence can be verified via exhaustive search. Removal of the watermarks
on bitstream level is considered infeasible, since no information on interconnection is plainly
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available. Removal attacks on the netlist level are regarded as far more likely. Therefore,
Schmid et al. include an attacker, who has access to the netlist of the design, into their
attacker model.
In 2017 Wallat et al. presented a practical removal attack on that scheme [16]. With
access to the netlist and the information that unused LUT inputs are connected to
GND, tracing all GND connections to LUTs instantly reveals the watermarked instances.
Subsequently removal of the watermark is a straightforward task.
To counter removal attacks, Schmid et al. already proposed the insertion of bogus cells
that generate constant signals. Wallat et al. directly propose the use of opaque predicates
to render their attack useless but also highlight the lack of hardware opaque predicates.
Using our instantiations one can efficiently harden the watermarks of Schmid et al.
against netlist level removal attacks. The idea is to connect the fixed LUT inputs to
an obfuscated constant that outputs a zero during the processing period instead of
connecting directly to GND. Since this connection does not affect LUT configuration the
watermark detection algorithm remains unaltered, but attacks on netlist level are hardened
tremendously, since state machine signals that reach LUTs are very common, i.e. our
integration is stealthy. Furthermore, by using multiple opaque predicates an attacker
might not be able to fully remove the watermark. This can be especially helpful if the
watermark is embedded with redundancy.
6 Conclusion
In this work we presented a novel technique to instantiate opaque predicates in hardware
on HDL level. We described how existing FSMs or counters can be used to implement
obfuscated constants without adding any additional gates. For situations where no existing
circuitry can be used, we presented and compared three algorithms to automatically
generate opaque predicates disguised in new FSM-like structures. We substantiated the
stealthiness of our approach by taking the viewpoint of an attacker and performed two
case studies on an FPGA to analyze the impact of our techniques on the overall design
size and latency. The results showed that it is possible to implement our opaque predicates
without additional FFs and only small overhead in LUTs of approximately 1%-2.2% while
not impacting latency. Finally we showed how our technique is able to mitigate the open
problem of netlist-level removal attacks for the LUT-based IP protection by Schmid et al.
[4]. To the best of our knowledge, by instantiating opaque predicates using existing FSMs
or counters, our approach is more stealthy than previous work and introduces less overhead.
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